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INDECENT EXPOSURE:
FCC V. FOX AND THE
END OF AN ERA
DAVID HOUSKA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Primetime broadcasting can be a grisly place. NBC airs
kidnappings and rapes on Law and Order: Special Victims Unit; CBS
presents gruesome murders on CSI; and Fox allows Jack Bauer to
beat and torture his way through several seasons of 24. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)—the federal agency charged
with regulating the airwaves—does not have a problem with all of this
violence and mayhem. What the FCC does consider unacceptable is
the use of seven “filthy words” immortalized by George Carlin:
1
“fuck,” “shit,” “cocksucker,” “piss,” “twat,” “turd,” and “fart.”
Although the FCC historically penalized networks only for the
repeated use of these words, Janet Jackson’s infamous “wardrobe
malfunction” during the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show prompted
the FCC to aggressively pursue broadcasters for even the fleeting use
2
of forbidden words and images. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
3
Inc., several broadcasters are seeking review of the FCC’s policies
and have presented the Supreme Court with the first facial challenge
4
to the FCC’s regulatory power over the airwaves in several decades.
First, this commentary will examine the various incidents at issue
in FCC v. Fox. After analyzing the legal background and the positions
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Brief for Petitioners at 4, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 10-1293 (U.S. Sept.
7, 2011); see also George Carlin, The Seven Words You Cannot Say on Television,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_Nrp7cj_tM&feature=youtu.be (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
Initially, the FCC focused its indecency-enforcement policy solely on the sustained and repeated
use of the words in the Carlin monologue. Brief for Petitioners at 5. It would later expand its
definition of “indecent” in response to broadcasts that eschewed the filthy words but remained
extremely offensive. Id. at 6.
2. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 10.
3. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, No. 10-1293 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2012).
4. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 8–10.
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of the FCC and the Respondents, this commentary argues that the
Supreme Court should overrule a decades-old precedent and allow
television broadcasters to operate free of almost any restrictions on
content.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Four separate incidents are at issue in this case. Although three of
these incidents involved the use of profanity, the fourth concerned a
seven-second image of a woman’s naked backside. The first violation
occurred on December 9th, 2002, during Fox Television’s live
5
broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards. The singer Cher incurred
an FCC fine for Fox when she remarked during an improvised
acceptance speech: “I’ve had my critics for the last 40 years saying I
was on my way out every year. Right. So fuck ‘em. I still have a job
6
and they don’t.” Bono, the lead singer of the band U2, provoked the
FCC to issue a fine against NBC in January, 2003, when he said, “[t]his
7
is really fucking brilliant” on live television. On December 10th, 2003,
Fox again broadcasted the Billboard Music Awards, this time hosted
by Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie. The FCC took issue with one of
Richie’s offhand remarks about her popular reality show The Simple
Life, specifically: “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have
you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking
8
simple.”
The final incident consolidated into FCC v. Fox stemmed from the
February 25th, 2003, airing of NYPD Blue. The episode, titled “Nude
Awakening,” contained an opening sequence that showed “the side of
9
one of [a woman’s] breasts and a full view of her back.” A few
seconds later “the camera . . . pan[ned] down to a shot of her buttocks,
10
linger[ed] for a moment, and then pan[ned] up her back.” Each of
the ABC affiliates that aired the episode incurred a $27,500 fine from
11
the FCC.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are four sources of authority that will weigh heavily in the
Supreme Court’s decision. First, the Court will look to the FCC’s
statutory authority to police the airwaves. Second, the Court will need
to consider how well its landmark decision in FCC v. Pacifica
12
Foundation has stood the test of time. Third, the Court will examine
the FCC’s pattern of enforcement over the decades. Finally, two other
precedent cases will color the Court’s thinking about the reach of
Pacifica.
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority
The Communications Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, both
established the FCC and placed limitations on broadcasters, stating
that anyone “who utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
13
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” The original statute,
however, specifically stated that the FCC—then simply a radiolicensing agency—would not enjoy the power to censor the airwaves
14
or enforce § 1464. Congress later granted the FCC the authority to
levy civil forfeitures against broadcasters or members of the public
who violated § 1464 by issuing a fine to the offending party that could
15
be appealed and reviewed in federal court.
B. The Pacifica Decision
The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain types of
“obscene” speech are outside the bounds of First Amendment
16
protection. What constituted acceptable regulation of “indecent”
speech on the airwaves that did not rise to the level of obscenity,
however, remained an open question until the Supreme Court’s

12. 438 U.S. 736 (1978).
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (West 2011).
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (West 2011). Congress did not originally give any executive branch
agency an explicit mandate to enforce § 1464, leaving it as a general criminal prohibition.
Section 326, however, specifically withheld the authority to censor the airwaves from the FCC,
leaving it to the Department of Justice to bring criminal charges. For a discussion of the
legislative history of this prohibition, see Brief for Respondents, infra note 18, at 3.
15. 47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West 2011).
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). Miller established that in order to be
considered obscene, speech must depict sexual activities in a manner that an average member of
the community would find to be patently offensive. Id. at 25. Moreover, the work, taken as a
whole, must also lack serious artistic, scientific, literary, or political value. Id.
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17

decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. In that case, the Pacifica
Radio Foundation broadcasted George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
monologue, which inquired why certain words were considered to be
18
indecent, prompting the FCC to fine Pacifica for indecency. Pacifica
challenged the FCC’s decision and claimed that regulation of indecent
speech violated its First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court rejected Pacifica’s argument and held that
broadcasting does not receive the same level of First Amendment
19
protection afforded to other forms of expression. The Court first
found that Carlin’s deliberate, repetitive, and provocative use of the
“seven words” constituted indecent (but not obscene) speech within
20
the meaning of § 1464. The Court further held that regulation of
indecent speech on the public airwaves was acceptable under the First
Amendment because of two unique features of radio and television
21
broadcasts. First, radio and television broadcasts were “a uniquely
pervasive presence” in the United States, and indecent programming
was therefore akin to a public nuisance coming uninvited into homes
22
and private lives. Second, because broadcasting was uniquely
accessible to children, the government had a legitimate interest in
shielding children from programming that could “enlarge [their]
23
vocabulary in an instant.”
C. The FCC’s Enforcement Policy
The Supreme Court limited its holding in Pacifica by declining to
address whether “the isolated use of a potentially offensive word”
24
could be constitutionally restricted. Accordingly, the FCC initially
interpreted its authority narrowly by confining its enforcement to
cases involving the repeated and sustained use of Carlin’s filthy
25
words. This under-inclusive policy was problematic, however,

17. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 (holding indecent speech may be regulated on radio and
television broadcasts).
18. Brief for Respondents at 4, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 10-1293 (U.S.
May 23, 2011).
19. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749–50 (holding that the unique characteristics of broadcasting
justified a lower level of First Amendment protection from government interference).
20. Id. at 739–41.
21. Id. at 748–49.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 749.
24. Id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 6. The Omnibus Order issued by the FCC in
2006 was both a statement of policy and a historical compilation of different decisions made by
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because limiting enforcement to only those specific words allowed for
the broadcasting of indecent material through creative, yet still
26
offensive, ways to describe sexual and execretory acts. In 1987, the
FCC revised its enforcement policy by adopting a context-specific
approach that examined the words used in a broadcast, the
27
broadcast’s overall message, and the intended effect on the audience.
Despite this new policy, the FCC maintained a relaxed enforcement
28
protocol, generally issuing fines for only the most egregious cases.
Starting in 2004, however, the FCC began to pursue perceived
indecencies on the airwaves more aggressively, finding for the first
time that even the isolated use of one of Carlin’s seven words was
29
indecent and worthy of a fine. Responding to complaints and
confusion from the broadcast networks, the FCC issued a new
Omnibus Order in 2006 intended to clearly define the FCC’s new
30
indecency definition and enforcement policy.
D. The Post-Pacifica Cases
Two other cases regarding the FCC’s regulation of broadcasters
will weigh in the Court’s consideration of FCC v. Fox. In FCC v.
31
League of Women Voters, the Court struck down a statutory
prohibition on publicly funded broadcasters airing editorial content.
The Court noted that the government’s right to impose restrictions on
32
the speech of broadcasters is not limitless. Instead, regulation of
broadcasters’ First Amendment speech must be narrowly tailored to
33
serve a “substantial government interest.”

the FCC over the preceding years. Id. at 7. The hope was that while the new policy was much
more amorphous than the old one, the Omnibus Order could give some clarity to the networks
by providing extensive illustrations of when the FCC decided to fine a network and when it
decided to forgo censoring a broadcaster. Id. at 8. Most of the documents and briefs associated
with this case therefore discuss the enforcement history of the FCC and the Omnibus Order
somewhat interchangeably.
26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 6 (describing a Howard Stern monologue that
discussed masturbation and bestiality, among other subjects, without ever using the filthy
words).
27. Id. at 7.
28. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 7.
31. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
32. Id. at 377.
33. Id. at 379.
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There is some tension between this doctrine and a prior Supreme
34
Court case, Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC. In Red Lion, the Court
upheld the “fairness doctrine,” a longstanding set of FCC regulations
requiring broadcasters to give those they criticize airtime and an
35
opportunity to rebut accusations made against them. The Court first
noted that since only a narrow band of the radio spectrum was
suitable for broadcasts, and since only one broadcaster could
effectively use a given frequency at any time, the broadcasters needed
government involvement (in the form of a limited monopoly over
36
certain frequencies) in order to operate effectively. Other media do
not need comparable levels of government involvement to function
37
properly.
Because broadcasters need active government
intervention, and because the government may set conditions on its
aid to private actors, the government has the right to demand certain
38
concessions from those to whom it grants a broadcast license. The
Red Lion “scarcity doctrine” thus established that broadcasters are
fundamentally different from others who engage in speech, and their
First Amendment freedoms are therefore subject to greater intrusion
by the government.
IV. THE RULING BELOW
The networks responded to the 2006 Omnibus Order by suing the
FCC in federal court. They alleged that the new policy was
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment and
that it exceeded the FCC’s authority under Pacifica to regulate speech
39
protected by the First Amendment. The Second Circuit initially
invalidated the Omnibus Order under the Administrative Procedure
Act, ruling that the FCC had failed to adequately justify its change in
policy. The Second Circuit did not, however, rule on the networks’
40
constitutional claims. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded for a ruling on whether the

34. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
35. Id. at 374–75.
36. Id. at 376.
37. See id. at 387 (finding no need for government licenses and grants of limited
monopolies for publishers of print media).
38. See id. at 388–89 (discussing how the scarcity of usable radio bandwidth justifies
government regulation of the airwaves to promote the public interest).
39. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S.
Ct. 1800 (2009).
40. Id.
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FCC’s policy violated the Fifth Amendment or exceeded Pacifica’s
41
restrictions on First Amendment speech.
On remand, the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC’s current
indecency-enforcement policy is unconstitutionally vague in violation
42
of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the Second
Circuit was bound by Pacifica to reject the networks’ First
Amendment challenges, it concluded that “[w]e do not suggest that
the FCC could not create a constitutional policy. We hold only that
43
the FCC’s current policy fails constitutional scrutiny.”
The court’s opinion detailed what the judges believed to be an
44
inexplicable pattern of enforcement by the FCC. This violated the
classic void-for-vagueness test since sophisticated networks, much less
a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, could not predict
45
what the FCC would consider to be indecent programming. For
example, in many episodes of NYPD Blue, the FCC found the use of
the word “bullshit” to be indecent but allowed the networks to say
46
“dick,” “dickhead,” “up yours,” “pissed off,” and “kiss my ass.” Given
that these phrases describe far more graphic activities than bovine
defecation, these examples are perplexing. Moreover, although the
FCC fined broadcasters for the isolated and unscripted use of single
expletives, it allowed all of the words on Carlin’s list to be used during
47
unedited airings of the film Saving Private Ryan. The FCC justified
the distinction on artistic grounds, claiming that the power and
realism of Saving Private Ryan would be severely diminished if the
offensive words were edited out, but the court found that this halfformed “artistic necessity doctrine” merely added another layer of
48
confusion and ambiguity to the enforcement standard. The court
held that the policy’s ambiguity not only resulted in fines for the
networks but also chilled their legitimate exercise of First
49
Amendment speech. As an example, the court noted that several
CBS affiliates—fearing regulatory action by the FCC—refused to air

41. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
42. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 461 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131
S. Ct. 3065 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1293).
43. Id. at 335.
44. Id. at 330–31.
45. Id. at 327 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
46. Id. at 330.
47. Id. at 331.
48. Id. at 333.
49. Id. at 335.
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an award-winning documentary about the 9/11 terrorist attacks
because the film contained expletive-filled radio communications of
50
firefighters and police officers.
V. ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court will first need to decide whether to uphold
the Second Circuit’s ruling that the FCC’s current policy is
unconstitutionally vague. Even if the Court finds that the FCC’s
policy passes muster under the Fifth Amendment, it will still need to
consider the facial challenge to Pacifica brought by the networks.
A. The Fifth Amendment Vagueness Claim
1. The FCC’s Attack on the Second Circuit Ruling
The FCC’s central contention on appeal to the Supreme Court is
that the Second Circuit improperly applied the test for
unconstitutional vagueness. The FCC argues that the Second Circuit
should have considered only whether the policy was unconstitutional
as applied to the broadcasters in this case, not whether the policy was
51
unconstitutionally vague on its face. The FCC also points out that
the networks’ own internal guidelines prohibit the use of expletives
and images of nudity, implying that the broadcasters were already
aware that using those words and images could be considered
52
offensive. Moreover, in the cases in question, the expletives were not
used to advance any kind of artistic, political, or social commentary,
but were merely instances of celebrities making fools of themselves
53
on camera. Wherever the murky boundaries of indecent language
may lie, there was no reason for Fox to believe that allowing Nicole
Richie to complain about “cow shit” in her Prada purse was decent
54
broadcasting within the meaning of § 1464.
The FCC gives three reasons why a flexible definition is both
harmless and desirable because of the particular nature of
55
broadcasting. First, the indecency standards are not enforced against
members of the general public but only against a handful of large,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 17.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33–36.
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56

sophisticated, and well-informed corporations. Thus, concerns that
ordinary citizens cannot distinguish between what a vague statute
57
allows and proscribes are not present here. Second, any harm done
by an amorphous policy is likely to be minimal as the networks’ own
internal guidelines are actually more restrictive than the FCC’s
requirements—the broadcasting companies and, in fact, most cable
channels (which are not subject to FCC regulation) generally prohibit
the use of Carlin’s words and voluntarily censor expletives during live
58
broadcasts. This “self-censorship,” combined with the fact that
graphic descriptions of sexual and excretory activity are not generally
considered within the core of the First Amendment, means that a
vague policy “is unlikely to foreclose a substantial amount of
59
broadcast speech.” Third, an inflexible indecency standard would
allow broadcasters to air extremely offensive material while avoiding
sanction by simply using words, phrases, and images that are not
60
explicitly prohibited by the FCC. A policy focusing only on
particular images and words, without looking at context, would not be
able to keep provocateurs from exploiting the malleability of the
spoken word and circumventing the purpose of the statutory
61
prohibitions. So long as the FCC is required to police the public
airwaves, a certain level of ambiguity in the indecency policy is both
necessary and desirable.
2. Respondents’ Reply
Although the FCC’s Fifth Amendment arguments center on
whether the broadcasters had sufficient notice that the isolated use of
expletives and nudity might be considered indecent, Respondents
contend that the main question for the Court is whether the
indecency definition is so vague as to invite arbitrary and capricious
62
enforcement. Respondents further argue that both the FCC’s
indecency-enforcement policy and its actual enforcement decisions
reveal a pattern of subjective judgments and decisions. Because each

56. Id. at 34.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 35.
59. See id. at 35–36 (arguing that even a vague policy will not have any significant chilling
effect on speech).
60. Id. at 35.
61. See id. (pointing out attempts by “shock jocks” to air offensive broadcasts without
using any prohibited words).
62. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 41.
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instance of indecency is determined individually, “the FCC may now
decide indecency complaints based on one, some, or all of the factors
it had previously announced, or it can decide cases on ‘other’ factors it
63
chooses to invoke at its whim.” This level of subjective judgment has
led to an enforcement pattern that is difficult to rationalize and even
more difficult for the networks to follow without gross amounts of
self-censorship. For example, the FCC declared that expletives were
acceptable in Saving Private Ryan because of the realistic nature of
the film but not in other works that strive for high levels of
64
authenticity and realism.
First, Respondents argue that the FCC’s indecency standards are
unconstitutionally vague even as applied to the specific incidents in
65
this case. The FCC had previously declined to hold that the isolated
66
and fleeting use of an expletive constituted indecent speech.
Additionally, Respondents contend that a court need not find that a
law was impermissibly vague as applied to a specific case, but only
that there is a real and substantial risk that the law’s vagueness would
67
invite arbitrary and capricious enforcement.
Second, Respondents argue that even if the pattern of
enforcement could be rationalized, the FCC’s definition is
68
impermissibly vague on its face. Respondents rely on Reno v.
69
ACLU, in which the Court found that an identical definition of
70
indecency used by another government agency was unconstitutional.
Because the definition of indecency relies on an amorphous appeal to
71
community standards instead of objective criteria, the FCC’s

63. Id. at 44 (referencing language from the FCC’s Omnibus Order allowing the agency to
use factors not enumerated in agency policy to make indecency judgments).
64. Id. at 45 (comparing the FCC’s decision on Saving Private Ryan to its decision that
Martin Scorsese’s inclusion of expletives in a documentary about Blues performers was
“shocking”).
65. Id. at 53.
66. Id. at 54 (pointing out that all the cases cited by the government as putting the
networks on notice were instances of egregiously offensive conduct).
67. Id. at 52.
68. See id. (noting that the policy does not list any objective definitions but only makes
vague appeals to context).
69. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
70. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 40 (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–74).
71. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872–73 (pointing out that the test for obscenity articulated in Miller
required not just that a work be considered offensive, but also that it lack any significant
redeeming value). Unlike the community standard for offensiveness, whether a work has some
larger scientific, political, or social purpose was considered to be a relatively fixed standard that
did not vary much either by community or over time. Id.
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enforcement can change at the whim of the agency. Consequently,
broadcasters are unable to predict what the FCC will consider
72
indecent in a given year.
Respondents agree that the Court should not rely on abstract
hypotheticals when conducting this analysis, arguing that the Second
Circuit used actual examples of FCC enforcement decisions to
73
conclude that the law is impermissibly vague. The FCC’s indecencyenforcement policy therefore violates the Fifth Amendment both on
its face and as applied.
B. The First Amendment Claim
1. Respondents’ Attack on Pacifica
Beyond the Fifth Amendment issues confronted by the Second
Circuit, Respondents invite the Supreme Court to strike down the
FCC’s indecency policy on First Amendment grounds and to overrule
74
Pacifica. Respondents argue that Pacifica rests almost entirely on
two factual assumptions—the pervasiveness of broadcasting and its
accessibility to children—which were dubious in 1978 and are
75
demonstrably untrue in 2012. The media market of the 1970s may
have been dominated by television and radio broadcasters, making
network programming “uniquely pervasive,” but the introduction of
cable television and the internet has completely reshaped mass
76
communication. Respondents cite several statistics to prove this
point: nearly ninety percent of American households subscribe to
some kind of cable or satellite television package; only a quarter of all
primetime viewers watch network television broadcasts; and most
teenagers spend vastly more time watching cable programming or
77
surfing the internet than viewing network broadcasts. Furthermore,
these figures do not account for other new media, such as video
games, that provide additional entertainment alternatives to
78
traditional broadcasting. The Court has consistently rejected efforts
to limit and regulate speech in these new media, leaving broadcasting

72. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 48.
73. Id. at 49–50.
74. Id. at 16–17.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id. at 18–19 (showing that teenagers spend two hours a day watching cable, compared
to just thirty-eight minutes on network broadcasts).
78. Id. at 20.
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in the peculiar position of being the only variety of mass media where
the government can regulate speech protected by the First
79
Amendment. Respondents also argue that although broadcasting
remains accessible to children, the internet and other new forms of
80
media are just as easy for a child to view. In fact, at the same time
that new technology such as the V-chip (which limits what programs
can be seen on a television) has made broadcasting less accessible to
children, the proliferation of smartphones and other mobile devices
has made the internet and other new media an omnipresence in most
81
children’s lives. Pacifica thus is an anachronism and should be
overruled so that the law does not continue to be driven by a media
market that no longer exists.
Even if the Court decides not to overturn Pacifica, Respondents
argue that Pacifica marks the outer limit of the FCC’s authority to
regulate the airwaves and that the use of fleeting expletives or images
82
of a woman’s back should not be subject to sanction. Under the
League of Women Voters test, the FCC may regulate broadcasters’
speech only if its policy is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
83
government interest. Respondents argue that the FCC’s current
enforcement policy fails both prongs of this test: there is neither a
substantial government interest nor a narrowly tailored policy. There
is no government interest in protecting children and squeamish adults
from isolated and fleeting exposure to curse words and brief glimpses
of parts of the naked body; children will learn the words eventually
and everyone presumably has seen naked buttocks somewhere
84
before. If Pacifica stands, Respondent argues, it should be read to
limit the FCC’s authority to cover only the most shocking and
egregious examples of indecent behavior.
2. The FCC’s Defense of Pacifica
The FCC contends that despite the post-1970s media revolution,
broadcasting remains a uniquely pervasive medium that is particularly
85
accessible to children. Over nineteen million households have
televisions that only receive the broadcast networks, and broadcast
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 44.
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programming continues to dominate the ratings charts. The FCC also
cites statistics showing that thirty-four percent of children have a
television in their bedroom without access to a cable or satellite
87
package. Broadcasting remains the easiest medium for children to
access because only a television and a power source are required to
view it, while cable and the internet require other affirmative steps by
88
the user. The fact that broadcasting might no longer be the nearly
exclusive source of at-home entertainment does not preclude its
continued dominance.
The FCC also relies on the Red Lion scarcity doctrine to justify its
continued enforcement of indecency standards. Because broadcasters
could not operate without a monopoly on certain frequencies granted
and enforced by the government, the government is in turn allowed to
require broadcasters to operate in a manner that promotes the public
89
interest. Just as broadcasters have, in the interests of public discourse
and fairness, been required to give equal airtime to those they
criticize, so too must the networks preserve their programming as a
90
safe haven from cruder media. The grant of a broadcast license thus
amounts to a bargain between the government and a network, and the
FCC is well within its rights to promote the government’s side of that
deal.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The FCC is going to lose this case and the only question is how
badly. The current indecency-enforcement standards have been
applied erratically over the last decade and are impermissibly vague
both in general and as applied to the facts of this case. In all
likelihood, the Court will issue a limited decision that strikes down
the FCC policy on vagueness grounds and does not reach the First
Amendment issue. Pacifica, however, was explicitly grounded on a set
of facts that simply are not true today and the Court should take this
opportunity to overrule an antiquated case. Given what the Roberts
Court has found to be worthy of First Amendment protection,
86. Id.
87. See id. at 46 (citing statistics about overall access to broadcast television).
88. Id. at 46–47.
89. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Brief for Petitioner, supra note
1, at 42–43.
90. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 43 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 (holding
that the unique elements of broadcasting allow the government to make special demands on the
grantees of broadcast licenses)).
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Pacifica should be overruled and the networks should be allowed to
broadcast any and all material protected by the Constitution.
A. Vagueness: In General and As Applied
The FCC’s indecency-enforcement policy embodied in its
Omnibus Order is vague on its face. The FCC issued the Omnibus
Order so that broadcasters could understand how its new policy
would work in practice, but this is impossible given the FCC’s erratic
pattern of enforcement. For example, the FCC sanctions the networks
for the momentary use of expletives but allowed their repeated use in
91
Saving Private Ryan. The FCC ruled that the use of those words was
artistically necessary in the context of that film, but it found a
documentary on the Blues, which contained interviews with musicians
using expletives to talk candidly about their lives and works, to be
92
indecent. There are no objective criteria that make the use of
expletives artistically necessary in a work of fiction but not in a
documentary. Moreover, any subjective judgments the FCC makes
about art would be arbitrary by definition. This vague and ambiguous
policy contrasts with the pre-2004 indecency definition, which focused
on the sustained repetition of the filthy words or gratuitous and
93
graphic depictions of sexual and excretory activities. This policy, in
94
practice, was used only against egregiously offensive broadcasts.
The FCC is correct that any indecency standard that ignores
context will inevitably lead to incoherent results. Context, however, is
perhaps the opposite of a specific and pre-determined standard, and
the FCC provides no uniform set of principles to guide its
95
determinations. Perhaps the most telling factor is that the FCC does
not contend anywhere in its brief that it enforces its indecency policy
96
evenhandedly. The FCC instead asserts that the central question for

91. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing the pattern of enforcement laid
out in the Omnibus Order).
92. Id.
93. Abigail T. Rom, Note, From Carlin’s Seven to Bono’s One: The Federal
Communications Commission’s Regulation of Those Words You Can Never Say on Broadcast
Television, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 732–35 (2010) (arguing that the new indecency policy gives
unconstitutional levels of discretion when compared with the old regime, and pointing out that
the FCC previously had declined to act against broadcasts that contained isolated expletives and
only fined networks whose programming approached Carlin levels of offensiveness).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 47 (arguing that the government has failed
to actually argue that the policy is clear and not enforced arbitrarily).
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the Court is not arbitrary enforcement in other instances, but whether
it was capricious to fine the broadcasters for the incidents at issue
97
here.
Even if the Court adopts the “as applied” framework urged by the
FCC, it is still likely to hold that the indecency definition is
impermissibly vague. Because for over two decades the FCC explicitly
held that the isolated use of an expletive was not indecent, Fox could
not have expected to incur liability by allowing Richie to ad lib on live
98
television. Although the FCC cites several instances where it fined
broadcasters for the use of the filthy words, all of those violations
99
involved the deliberate and repeated use of profanity.
The way the FCC approaches other words only further clouds the
matter. The word “fuck” is considered presumptively indecent by the
100
FCC because of its sexual connotations, but was used by Bono
merely as a point of emphasis and not in a sexual manner. The phrases
“kiss my ass” and “up yours” describe graphic sexual activities, but are
101
allowed on television. The only defense offered for this distinction is
merely that unlike the approved words and phrases, “fuck” and “shit”
102
are intrinsically offensive because of their basic meanings —an odd
conclusion given that “up yours” describes an action that involves the
core definitions of both “fuck” and “shit.” Furthermore, if the words
“fuck” and “shit” are considered offensive in and of themselves,
regardless of how they are used, then the FCC should not have
permitted the unedited broadcast of Saving Private Ryan. There is
simply no way to make sense of the totality of the FCC’s new
enforcement regime without falling back on the subjective, and
therefore unconstitutional, aesthetic judgments of the agency. Nor
does this necessarily mean that the FCC must ignore context and
publish an exhaustive list of words and phrases that may not be used
on television; rather, only that their contextual standard must be
limited by clear, objective criteria, similar to those used in Miller v.
103
104
California to determine what constitutes an obscenity. At a

97. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 25.
98. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 5 (pointing to the FCC’s historical practice
of not fining networks for fleeting expletives).
99. Id. at 54.
100. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing the FCC’s awareness that the
“F-Word” is inconsistent with contemporary community standards).
101. Id. at 28–29.
102. Id.
103. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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minimum, therefore, the Court is likely to find the FCC indecency
policy unconstitutionally vague, to dismiss the fines, and to require the
105
agency to promulgate a new policy.
B. The End of Pacifica
If the Court rules for the Respondents on the vagueness issue, it
may decide not to address Pacifica. In the last two years, however, the
Court has found that shouting homophobic slurs and “thank God for
106
dead soldiers” at a military funeral is fully protected speech, that
video games involving lighting school girls on fire and then urinating
on them are just as worthy of First Amendment protection as The
107
Divine Comedy, and that contributions to political campaigns by
108
corporations cannot be constitutionally restricted. For the Court to
then decide to draw a line in the sand at a seven-second image of a
naked woman’s posterior would be absurd. The Court should take this
opportunity to overrule Pacifica and strike down all limitations on
First Amendment activities by broadcasters. The decision to overturn
Pacifica ought to be straightforward given that Pacifica was driven
entirely by circumstances that simply no longer exist. It probably was
fair to characterize broadcasting as a uniquely pervasive medium in
1978. Most houses had televisions or radios and—in the dark days
before basic cable—broadcast radio and television were the exclusive
109
forms of mass media that could be consumed in the home. Today,
broadcast networks are better known as what you must scroll past on
the interactive guide before arriving at HBO, Starz, and the Playboy
Channel. DVDs and Netflix have added to what a television set can
do, and this is before considering the magnitude of entertainment
options available through Xbox 360, PlayStation 3, or Wii. Above all
else, though, the internet’s explosive growth guarantees that
104. Id. at 24 (outlining a test for obscenity that requires, among other things, a finding that
an average and reasonable member of the community would find a work, taken as a whole, to
appeal to a prurient interest in sex).
105. See Jerome A. Barron, Comment, FCC v. Fox Television Stations and the FCC’s New
Fleeting Expletive Policy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 567, 584 (2010) (predicting that the Court will
uphold Pacifica but strike down the new FCC policy).
106. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1220–21 (2011) (holding that the openly
offensive anti-gay protests by the Westboro Baptist Church at military funerals are protected
speech).
107. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4, 2738 (2011) (holding that
extremely violent video games are protected speech).
108. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916–17 (2010) (holding that expenditures
on political campaigns by corporations are protected speech).
109. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978).
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broadcasting will never again be the only form of truly mass media.
Given the substantially reduced role of broadcast television and
radio in the modern media marketplace, it is hard to contend that
broadcasting is more accessible to children than the internet. The
FCC contends that accessing the internet requires certain “affirmative
steps” that accessing broadcasting does not, but even taken at face
value this argument only accounts for the home environment and
ignores the fact that children have access to the internet almost
everywhere—in schools, in libraries, on their smartphones, and even
111
on their friends’ smartphones. Pacifica is an anachronism that only
made sense in a world where home entertainment was confined to
three channels and a radio set.
If Pacifica stands, it is not likely to be expanded to cover the
112
present case. The Court ruled in 1978: “It is appropriate, in
conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding . . . . We have
not decided that an occasional expletive . . . would justify any
113
sanction.” This passage was written before the advent of cable
television and the internet, and becomes particularly important when
the use of fleeting expletives and images of a woman’s naked back are
considered under the League of Women Voters test. It is difficult to
articulate what actual harm results from children occasionally hearing
words they will learn eventually or from briefly seeing familiar parts
of the human body in a non-sexual context. Indeed, many high school
students now read the classic novel Ulysses, once considered obscene
114
because of its use of expletives. Revealingly, the FCC does not
attempt to articulate any significant government interest in forcing
broadcasters into an unnaturally clean style of speech. Instead, the
FCC declares that the Court should not require it to articulate why it
is so important that children not learn explicit words from the
television instead of from their parents, teachers, coaches, or fellow

110. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 326 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 3065 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1293) (pointing out that the internet has already
become a dominant form of media and will only become more important in the future).
111. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 47–48 (illustrating the pervasive presence of
the internet today).
112. See Barron, supra note 105, at 585 (predicting that the Court will uphold Pacifica but
strike down the new FCC policy).
113. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
114. Cara L. Newman, Note, Eyes Wide Open, Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, and the
First Amendment in Contemporary America, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 134–35 (2003) (discussing
how Ulysses caused a shift in what was considered obscene).
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115

third graders. The proposed expansion of the Pacifica holding to
cover fleeting expletives thus clearly runs afoul of League of Women
Voters and should be rejected.
The Court is also unlikely to agree with the FCC’s justifications
based on Red Lion. As Respondents point out, the requirements
upheld in Red Lion and similar cases were affirmative duties imposed
on broadcasters to allow others access to the airwaves—a natural
requirement given the demand for broadcast licenses and the limited
116
number of usable frequencies. The scarcity doctrine might impose
affirmative duties on license holders, but this does not mean that
broadcasters enjoy less First Amendment protection than other
117
actors. The FCC’s argument requires the Court to actually expand
the holding of Red Lion, rather than simply follow a controlling
precedent. Therefore, the Court is likely to extend to broadcasters the
full protection of the First Amendment—a right they have been
denied for more than thirty years.
VII. CONCLUSION
It made a certain amount of sense to subject broadcasters to
greater regulation when mass media consisted of four television
stations, AM and FM radio, and perhaps one or two significant movie
releases a week. The world could not be more different today.
Broadcast television is a fleeting afterthought in an exploding media
marketplace and could become obsolete as the internet generation
comes of age. The Court should recognize this new reality and give
television the right to be just as absurd and indecent as YouTube.

115. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 20–21 (discussing how even a single uttered
expletive can cause a damaging expansion in a child’s vocabulary).
116. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (finding that the number
of persons seeking a broadcast license greatly exceeds the available space in the electromagnetic
spectrum; broadcast space is therefore a uniquely scarce resource).
117. Brief for Respondents, supra note 18, at 37. Respondents also note throughout their
discussion of Red Lion that the growth of other forms of media has undercut demand for space
on the radio frequency and reduced the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcasting. Id. This
undermines the basic scarcity rationale for Red Lion and calls the continued viability of that
case into question as well. Id. (pointing out that Red Lion was always believed to have a
“limited shelf life”).

